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Abstract
The upcoming withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union is a source 
of tensions within the political system of the UK. Devolution is most likely to be affect-
ed by Brexit which can lead to conflicts between the UK as a whole and Scotland as its 
part. The Sewel Convention is a political constitutional norm establishing non-legal 
rules of cooperation between these two political bodies. Despite having been written 
in a statute, the Sewel Convention remains unenforceable by the courts. Nonetheless, 
the political consequences of diminishing it may be severe. The discrepancy between 
the political strength of Scottish nationalism, confirmed in the latest general election, 
and constitutional lack of Scottish “voice” in regard to Brexit may lead to a severe po-
litical crisis within the UK.
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Streszczenie
Brexit, dewolucja i niepodległość Szkocji. Znaczenie prawne 
i polityczne konwenansu Sewela w Zjednoczonym Królestwie
Nadchodzące wystąpienie Zjednoczonego Królestwa Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północ-
nej z Unii Europejskiej jest źródłem napięć w ramach systemu politycznego tego kraju. 
Brexit z dużym prawdopodobieństwem wpłynie na dewolucję w UK, powodując kon-
flikty pomiędzy Zjednoczonym Królestwem jako całością oraz Szkocją jako jego częścią. 
Konwenans Sewela jest polityczną normą konstytucyjną ustanawiającą pozaprawne re-
guły współpracy pomiędzy oboma ciałami politycznymi. Pomimo tego, że konwenans 
został umieszczony w ustawie, nie jest możliwy do wyegzekwowania przez sądy, poli-
tyczne konsekwencje jego złamania mogą być jednak znaczne. Rozdźwięk pomiędzy siłą 
polityczną szkockiego nacjonalizmu, potwierdzoną w ostatnich wyborach parlamentar-
nych, a konstytucyjnym brakiem „głosu” Szkocji w odniesieniu do Brexitu może dopro-
wadzić do poważnego kryzysu politycznego w Zjednoczonym Królestwie.
*
The notion of upcoming Brexit has a tremendous influence not only on UK2 
external relations but also on its internal constitutional order. The aim of 
this paper is to depict possible legal and political consequences of the Sew-
el Convention, which establishes modus vivendi – the mode of living – be-
tween the Westminster and Scotland, particularly in light of the British 
withdrawal from the European Union. The first part of this paper shortly 
depicts basics of the British constitutional system and the history behind 
the emergence of the Sewel Convention. The latter part explores issues re-
garding possible justiciability and enforceability of the convention after it 
was put on a statutory footing in the context of the famous Miller case. The 
paper ends with conclusions regarding a political impact of the conven-
tion, arguing that the current setting strengthens the Scottish independ-
ence movement and may lead to a severe constitutional and political crisis 
with respect to devolution.
2 Abbr. United Kingdom.
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I. Key features of the British constitutional system
Several remarks have to be made at the beginning in order to depict a back-
ground against which the subject of this article will be presented. Firstly, the 
United Kingdom neither enjoys a codified, single constitution, nor central-
ised judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation3. Often this system 
is referred to as a system of an “unwritten” constitution, but this descrip-
tion does not entirely fit the legal reality, since many rules forming the Brit-
ish constitution are indeed written in the form of statutes4. It is true however 
that these constitutional legal rules do not form a single body of law and they 
are not entrenched and not formally superior over other laws. What is more, 
by and large the Parliament cannot be restricted by the courts in executing 
its legislative functions under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. As 
it was stated in the watershed case of Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke: “It is 
often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other rea-
sons against doing them are so strong that most people would regard it as 
highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean that 
it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things, If Parliament chose 
to do any of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid”5. 
However, it is important to note that the courts are entitled to deliver effec-
tive judicial review of executive basing on legal rules enacted by the Parlia-
ment and constitutional precedents.
Secondly, there are also non-legal rules called “conventions” which form 
a significant part of the British constitutional and political system. Con-
stitutional conventions regulate political behaviour in the form of unen-
forceable norms originating from mutual compliance, often – though not 
always – based on custom6. T. Wieciech indicates that they are composed 
of the following features: 1) normative character which means that they 
3 C. Turpin, A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 7th edition, Cambridge 
2011, p. 4.
4 See for example: Human Rights Act 1998 (c42).
5 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC).
6 For definitions see: A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 
ed. R.E. Michener, Indianapolis 1982, p. 82; K.C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions, Oxford 
1966, p. 122.
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are binding, 2) the status of constitutional rules, 3) informality, 4) non-le-
gal character, 5) lack of precise legal sanction and enforcement procedure7. 
The strict distinction between constitutional conventions and customs 
tends to be overlooked, however the authors underline the special consti-
tutional value of conventions in contrast to customs and their normative, 
though non-legal status (points 1 and 2 above)8. The conventions can be ei-
ther unwritten or written, for example in the form of a manual. Although 
they cannot be subject to decisive judicial review, sometimes they can help 
to unveil the meaning of an enforceable legal rule and be used as an inter-
pretative tool9. Lacking direct legal sanction, conventions base their effec-
tiveness either on a long tradition of their application or on common sense 
of involved parties. A great example of such a convention is the rule stating 
that the British monarch acts upon the advice of his or her Government10. 
Formally there is no law to force the monarch to adhere to this convention 
and the courts could not enforce it, nonetheless political and social conse-
quences of breaking it would be so severe that it could mean the end of the 
British parliamentary monarchy.
Thirdly, contrary to a cursory impression the United Kingdom is rath-
er a unitary country, not a federal one, though a degree of autonomy grant-
ed to particular regions is relatively high. Some propose to call it a “union 
state” as in fact it is “neither straightforwardly unitary nor systematically 
federal in character”11. The Government is centrally organised and there is 
a lack of any kind of constitutionally binding, formal agreement between 
particular parts of the UK such as Scotland, England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. However, the structure of the state is organised around the doctrine 
of devolution. Devolution means the delegation of some powers from one in-
stitution to another. In continental law, for example in Poland, it can mean 
the situation when a court of higher instance takes a case which is usually 
7 T. Wieciech, Konwenanse konstytucyjne, Kraków 2011, p. 20.
8 Ibidem, p. 54.
9 See: N.W. Barber, Laws and constitutional conventions, “Law Quarterly Review” 2009, 
No. 125/294, pp. 1–2; A. McHarg, Constitutional Change and Territorial Consent: the Miller 
case and the Sewel Convention, [in:] The UK Constitution after Miller: Brexit and Beyond, ed. 
M. Elliott et al., London 2018, p. 12.
10 V. Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford 1995, pp. 65–66.
11 C. Turpin, A Tomkins, op.cit., p. 210.
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heard before a court of lower instance12. In the context of British constitu-
tionalism devolution stands for administrative decentralisation of the state. 
Devolved territories, such as Scotland, receive a power to decide a variety 
of enlisted subjects on their own, through their own legislative and execu-
tive bodies13. The scope of these powers is referred to as “devolved matters” 
and includes such topics as education or health14. Some powers are reserved 
only for the central Government – they include foreign affairs and army15. 
It is important to note that the source of devolution always lies in Westmin-
ster. The Parliament decides about vesting some particular powers in de-
volved bodies, but under the current constitutional setting it can also arbi-
trarily reverse its decision.
II. Short history behind the Sewel Convention
There is one constitutional convention particularly important for rela-
tions between the United Kingdom as a whole and Scotland as its part. As 
the Scotland Act 2016 stipulates: “But it is recognised that the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”16. This provision 
introduced the so-called Sewel Convention into the written statute of the 
Scotland Act. The Sewel Convention was originally formed during the debate 
on the Scotland Act 1998 when Lord Sewel, at that time the Under-Secre-
tary of State at the Scottish Office, gave a following statement: “as happened 
in Northern Ireland earlier in the century, we would expect a convention 
to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard 
to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parlia-
12 See for example: art. 25 § 2 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, Act of 6th June 
1997 (Dz.U. No. 89, item 555 with chang.).
13 M. Keating, The Government of Scotland. Public Policy Making after Devolution, 2nd 
edition, Edinburgh 2010, pp. 34–35.
14 Devolved matters are not enlisted in the statute. The rule is that what is not reserved 
for the UK Parliament is devolved to the Scottish Parliament. See: the Scotland Act 1998.
15 For a typical list of those powers see: Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998, https://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/schedule/5 (1.11.2019).
16 Scotland Act 2016 (c11), p. 2, inserting 28(8) into the Scotland Act 1998 (c42).
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ment”17. Later, when Scottish people decided to stay in the United Kingdom 
in the Scottish independence referendum 2014, the so-called Smith Com-
mission started its work in order to fulfil “the Vow” to increase the devolu-
tion powers vested in Scotland18. One of the effects was a recommendation 
to introduce the Sewel Convention into the Scotland Act and this notion 
was indeed approved by the Government and Parliament. However, the con-
vention, even on a statutory footing, does not legally constrict the UK Par-
liament in a sense that the Parliament is still sovereign and independent, 
and can “make or unmake any law whatever”19, including legislating on de-
volved matters or changing the scope of Scotland’s political freedom with-
out the consent of the Scottish Parliament. What is more, the convention is 
in no sense permanently entrenched and does not form any kind of binding 
“federal agreement” between Scotland and the United Kingdom as a whole, 
hence it can be removed from the statute just like every piece of legislation. 
The issue of its justiciability and enforceability will be explored in greater 
detail in the following paragraph.
III. Enforceability of the Sewel Convention
There are many arguments to back a thesis that section 28.8 of the Scotland 
Act 1998 is not enforceable and hence its legal role is strictly constrained. 
Firstly, the origin of this provision is the convention already described 
above and the nature of constitutional conventions is that they work more 
like political guidelines, some kind of constitutional “savoir-vivre” and not 
like enforceable legal rules. Arguably, conventions are binding even though 
they lack sanction but it does not change the distinctive feature of their 
unenforceability. As put it J. Jaconelli: “The categorisation of constitution-
al conventions as a species of social rule simultaneously captures two of 
17 Lords Hansard, vol. No. 592, part No. 191, 21 July 1998, column 791, https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo980721/text/80721–20.htm#80721–20_spnew2 
(27.10.2019).
18 Scottish Parliament Information Centre, The Smith Commission Report – Overview, 
pp. 4–6, 11, http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_15–03_
The_Smith_Commission_Report-Overview.pdf (27.10.2019).
19 A.V. Dicey, op.cit., p. 20.
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their fundamental features: their normative quality, in prescribing stand-
ards of behaviour; and the fact that they are not enforced in the courts”20. 
When it comes to the Sewel Convention the UK Government openly ex-
plained its approach in the Memorandum of Understanding: “The United 
Kingdom Parliament retains authority to legislate on any issue, whether de-
volved or not. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide what use to make of 
that power”21. The main question was: had the Sewel Convention become 
enforceable by the courts of law when the amendment of the Scotland Act 
had been issued by the UK Parliament? In the above mentioned Miller case 
this very question was addressed to the Justices of the UK Supreme Court, 
since it was important to determine whether Scotland can exercise a “le-
gal veto” against the Withdrawal Bill based on the argument that it would 
significantly interfere with devolved matters or at least modify their range. 
Although conventions have been written down at times, they have histor-
ically not been placed on a statutory footing, making the case potentially 
distinguishable22. The Supreme Court however decided that the convention 
remained political in nature and was not transformed into an enforceable 
legal rule. One of the arguments was the use of certain words by the law-
maker such as “it is recognised” and “will not normally legislate” – these 
phrases suggest that it was not an intention of the Parliament to convert 
the Sewel Convention into an absolute rule which could be then enforced 
by the courts23. This judgment fits into the British judiciary’s prudent ap-
proach to matters of political importance and upholds restrictive views on 
constitutional conventions. However as points out T. Mullen, the Supreme 
Court presented in Miller even more cautious approach than usual, since it 
20 J. Jaconelli, Do Constitutional Conventions Bind?, “The Cambridge Law Journal” 2005, 
No. 64, p. 151.
21 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United King-
dom Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee, p. 8, 14, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Ad-
ministrations.pdf (1.11.2019).
22 A. Gordon, Devolution, Brexit, and the Sewel Convention, p. 5, https://consoc.org.uk/
publications/devolution-brexit-and-the-sewel-convention (26.12.2019).
23 R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5, para. 148 and 149.
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not only ruled on non-justiciability, but also refrained from specifying the 
meaning and requirements of the convention24. It suggests that courts can 
only confirm the existence of conventions, but not elaborate on their un-
derstanding. Such a narrow view met criticism among scholars – some sug-
gested that it was not clearly justified and that in fact the Supreme Court 
seemed not to be aware that it took a more stringent stand when compared 
with previous judgments25. However controversial, this restrictive approach 
should not surprise taking into consideration how heated the political dis-
cussion regarding both Brexit and Scottish independence has been. Enough 
to say that after this case the Justices became the subject of vicious attack 
in media, having even been called “the enemies of the People” for ruling 
that the UK Government needed to obtain the consent of the Parliament 
to withdraw from the EU26.
Although legally sensible, the Supreme Court’s ruling stripped section 28.8 
of any practical meaning, making this statutory provision no more signifiant 
than an informal manual. The final political effect of the judgment is that it 
empowered the Parliament and strengthened the rule of parliamentary sover-
eignty at the expense of the executive and devolved administrations. On a side 
note it is worth reminding that even if the convention had been deemed jus-
ticiable due to its statutory footing, the judgment could not restrict the Par-
liament’s power to “unmake” such law in the future.
IV. Possible political consequences of the Sewel Convention in light of Brexit
The true significance of section 28.8 seems to manifest itself in its politi-
cal reasons and possible political consequences. As it was mentioned be-
fore, the convention was written down in a form of statute as part of recom-
mendations of the Smith Commission after a positive for the UK outcome 
24 T. Mullen, The Brexit case and constitutional conventions, “Edinburgh Law Review” 2017, 
vol. 21(3), pp. 1–2, http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/144492/7/144492.pdf (25.12.2019).
25 See: T. Mullen, op.cit., p. 4; A. McHarg, op.cit., p. 14.
26 R. Pells, Daily Mail’s ‘Enemies of the People’ front page receives more than 1,000 complaints 
to IPSO, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/daily-mail-nazi-propaganda-front-page-
ipso-complaints-brexit-eu-enemies-of-the-people-a7409836.html (25.12.2019).
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of the Scottish independence referendum 2014. Increasing the scope of 
devolution and placing the convention into the statute were all part of “the 
Vow” – a promise made by leaders of unionist UK political parties in order 
to convince the people of Scotland to remain within the UK27. It is said that 
“the Vow” had “an enormous impact on the campaign”, though it is even 
not certain if such a document like the one presented on the cover of the 
Scotland’s Daily Record ever existed28. Nevertheless it is quite obvious that 
a discussion about the level of freedom and self-reliance of Scotland as part 
of the United Kingdom is embedded in the sensitive dispute whether Scot-
land should stay within the UK or not. A greater level of autonomy granted 
to Scotland and Westminster’s respect of the legal boundaries preventing it 
from interfering with devolved matters is clearly helpful in convincing part 
of the Scottish people that the union with England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland is not detrimental to their interests. It may change drastically when 
Westminster and the HM Government chooses to legislate and decide on 
devolved matters and to ignore the disapproval of the Scottish Parliament. 
There is a clear conflict of interests when it comes to Brexit since the ma-
jority of Scots voted against it and so did the Scottish Parliament when it 
initially decided not to support the Withdrawal Bill29. Arguably, The Scot-
tish Parliament was able to do so since the Withdrawal Bill was clearly go-
ing to change the state of many devolved matters, speaking precisely: the 
scope of Scotland’s freedom would have been altered since the matters of 
UE law were to return under Westminster power and not directly to de-
27 See an article on the BBC website summarising the history of the Vow: J. Cook, What 
now for ‘the vow’?, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29443603 (1.11.2019).
28 R. Greenslade, ‘The Vow’ and the Daily Record – creative journalism or political spin?, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/31/daily-record-scottish-inde-
pendence (1.11.2019).
29 The results of the EU referendum by regions can be found at the Electoral Commission 
website: Results and turnout at the EU referendum, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/
who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/
eu-referendum/results-and-turnout-eu-referendum (1.11.2019). See the Motion S5M-12223 
of 15.05.2018 of the Scottish Parliament, https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusi-
ness/28877.aspx?SearchType=Advance&ReferenceNumbers=S5M-12223&ResultsPerPage=10 
(1.11.2019), later described by S. Carrell, Scottish parliament decisively rejects EU withdrawal 
bill, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/15/scottish-parliament-decisively-re-
ject-eu-withdrawal-bill-brexit (1.11.2019).
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volved bodies. The Scottish Parliament would not have a legal power to au-
tonomously retain parts of EU legislation after Brexit if it was not compliant 
with Westminster policy. Since the Sewel Convention does not only apply 
to substantive legislation on devolved matters, but also regulates changes 
to the scope of powers vested in devolved administrations, approval of the 
Scottish Parliament might have been formally needed in order to pass such 
legislation30. Although the Supreme Court did not elaborate on the scope of 
the convention in Miler and merely decided it not to be justiciable, this it-
self led to a conclusion that the British Parliament could without legal res-
ervation ignore Scottish disapproval. However, political consequences may 
be severe – breaking or diminishing the Sewel Convention along with tak-
ing a course on Brexit may lead to a significant drop of Scottish people’ ap-
proval towards staying in the United Kingdom. Apart from resorting to the 
protection of the Sewel Convention, Scotland tried to prepare itself to Brex-
it by adopting The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Conti-
nuity) (Scotland) Bill 2018 in order to stipulate that legislation on devolved 
matters being currently controlled by the European Union would return 
under the power of the Scottish Parliament. As it seems, Scots were not ea-
ger to let the powers exercised by the EU be vested in Westminster. The bill 
was partially held by the UK Supreme Court to be out of the Scottish Par-
liament devolved legislative competence, especially in case of the enactment 
of the UK Withdrawal Act which indeed happened, leaving a huge part of 
the Scottish bill invalid31. The result is that the bill cannot be submitted for 
Royal Assent in its present form. It is worth comparing with Miller where 
the Supreme Court did not impose any restrictions on Westminster with 
respect to the Sewel Convention. As stated it A. Gordon: “there are limits 
to the powers of the devolved, but not those of the ‘devolver’”32. While this 
asymmetry is constitutionally justifiable, it surely creates a burning polit-
ical problem.
30 In reference to the scope of the Sewel Convention see for example: Devolution Guidance 
Note 10 https://www2.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/37349/0066833.pdf (1.11.2019), section 4, 
point III together with section 6.
31 The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill – A Refer-
ence by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland (Scotland), [2018] UKSC 64.
32 A. Gordon, op.cit., p. 6.
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Against this backdrop a proposition to conduct a second independence 
referendum was introduced by the Scottish Government33. Nicola Sturgeon, 
Scotland’s first minister, wrote a letter to then newly appointed British prime 
minister, Boris Johnson, asking to discuss her proposal of carrying out the ref-
erendum34. After that, The United Kingdom general election of 12th December 
2019 brought a major victory for The Conservative Party, but at the same time 
strengthened the Scottish National Party35. That intensified the SNP’s engage-
ment in lobbying for the referendum. Ms. Sturgeon argues that there has been 
a significant change of circumstances due to upcoming Brexit – “I accept, re-
gretfully, that he [Boris Johnson] has a mandate for Brexit in England but he 
has no mandate whatsoever to take Scotland out of the EU”, said Scotland’s 
First Minister. Current Brexit extension deadline is set at 31st January 2020 af-
ter PM Borris Johnson was legally forced by the previous UK Parliament to re-
quest for it36. The Conservatives’ electoral success makes it almost certain that 
indeed the UK will leave the EU in January. At the same time, PM Johnson de-
cisively rejected any propositions of having the second Scottish independence 
referendum37. Nevertheless, the latest polls show that the support for the inde-
pendence in Scotland is growing, though not conclusively yet38. The discrepan-
cy between the political strength of Scottish nationalism, confirmed in the lat-
est elections, and constitutional lack of Scottish “voice” in regard to Brexit will 
most probably give rise to further controversies, especially if Northern Ireland 
finally receives a special status under the new Brexit deal.
33 The Referendums (Scotland) Bill was introduced on 28th May 2019 and is currently 
going through the first stage of legislative process. See The Scottish Parliament website: Ref-
erendums (Scotland) Bill, https://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/111844.
aspx (1.11.2019).
34 L. Brooks, Nicola Sturgeon calls for new Scottish independence vote, https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/25/nicola-sturgeon-calls-for-new-scotland-indepen-
dence-vote (1.11.2019).
35 BBC News, UK results: Conservatives win majority, https://www.bbc.com/news/elec-
tion/2019/results (27.12.2019).
36 See the official letter from PM Boris Johnson to EU Council President Donald Tusk, https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-president-donald-tusk-28-oc-
tober-2019 (1.11.2019).
37 BBC News, General election 2019: PM Johnson ‘remains opposed’ to holding indyref2, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2019–50789771 (27.12.2019).
38 See: Survation Archive, https://www.survation.com/archive/2019-2 (27.12.2019).
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V. Conclusion
The whole discussion surrounding the Sewel Convention clearly depicts 
strengths and weaknesses of an uncodified constitution and unenforceable 
conventions. On the one hand, the whole system seems to be more flexible 
and efficient than in jurisdictions with written constitutions and expanded 
judicial review. One could argue that the balance between judiciary, execu-
tive and legislative in the UK is well-preserved mostly due to prudent and 
self-limiting judicial power which hardly interfere with policy-making and 
does not decide on most constitutional matters covered by political conven-
tions. A real problem occurs when there is a dilemma of highest constitu-
tional importance and both legislative and executive powers cannot restrain 
from breaking or bending the rules of conduct. That is the case of the Sew-
el Convention. It is argued that constitutional conventions are binding sim-
ilarly to moral obligations even though they are not directly enforceable39. 
But what is the practical value of rules of conduct when there is a lack of legal 
sanctions for a misbehaviour? Consequences are only political, but they may 
lead to a situation far worse than if the judiciary was to intervene on earlier 
stages in order to enforce conventions. The Sewel Convention is an extraor-
dinary example because differently from many others it organises a rule of 
conduct between a superior and inferior political body. In many cases obser-
vance of conventions may be secured by political pragmatism: “We will not 
breach this rule of conduct because when we do so the other party will most 
likely do the same when they are in power and everyone will suffer a loss”. As 
observed both A.V. Dicey and W.I. Jennings, and as framed it M. Caulfield: 
“despite their ambiguity conventions are observed because of the problems 
that arise if they are not”40. That kind of thinking does not work in relations 
between Westminster and devolved administrations due to the asymmetry of 
power. In many legal systems it would be a role of the courts of law to secure 
that a superior administrative power observe the rules of conduct towards an 
inferior political body, but it seems very unlikely to happen under the pre-
dominant doctrine of the sovereignty of the Parliament. In consequence fur-
39 J. Jaconelli, op.cit., p. 151.
40 M. Caulfield, Constitutional Conventions in the United Kingdom: Should they be codified?, 
“The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics” 2012, vol. 1, p. 46.
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ther political tensions are likely to arise in absence of a constitutional setting 
reflecting the role of Scotland as devolved government.
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